Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 3 Environmental Law Journal: "City Rivers"

Article 9

January 2005

Considering Environmental Justice in the Decision
to Unbundle Renewable Energy Certificates
Ida Martinac

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ida Martinac, Considering Environmental Justice in the Decision to Unbundle Renewable Energy Certificates, 35 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
(2005).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss3/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Martinac: Unbundle Renewable Energy

COMMENT
CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN THE DECISION TO

UNBUNDLE RENEWABLE
ENERGY CERTIFICATES
INTRODUCTION

Renewable Energy Certificates (hereinafter "REC"), traded
to satisfy the Renewables Portfolio Standard (hereinafter
"RPS") annual procurement targets, should remain bundled
with the underlying energy, to the extent practicable, for the
purpose of protecting ratepayers, local environment, and disadvantaged communities often subjected to environmental mjustice.
l

1 The primary defmition of the term "bundled," as it relates to the electric industry, can be found in the following context: "Bundled utility service (electric): A means of
operation whereby energy, transmission, and distribution services, as well as ancillary
and retail services, are provided by one entity." See Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_b.htm(lastvisited Jan 20,2004).
Another definition of the term "bundled," closer to the usage in this Comment,
is related to tradable commodities: "Emissions trading makes it possible to 'bundle'
emission compliance with either raw materials or finished products, enabling firms to
differentiate their products in terms of price, public perception or both. Emission compliance can move up or down the supply chain, as firms attempt to divest liability to, or
remove liability from, suppliers or consumers of their products. In this manner, firms
might sell 'greenhouse neutral' products to enhance their competitive position.
Bundling has already been demonstrated in other commodity and emission trading
markets. For example, in the US sulphur dioxide market, high sulphur coal producers
routinely bundle their coal with sulphur dioxide emission allowances to secure safes.
This enables those producers to remain price-competitive with low sulphur alternatives, and provide price certainty to their clients." See Cantor Fitzgerald in association
with PriceWaterHouse Coopers, The Global Hub for Carbon Commerce available at
http://www.co2e.com/strategies/AdditionaIInfo.asp?PageID=257 (last visited Jan 20,
2005).

491

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 9

492

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Theoretically, the "renewable" attribute of renewable energy can be separated from the underlying energy and then
sold in the form of Renewable Energy Credits, separately from
the underlying physical electricity! Such trading is in existence nationally, though not necessarily associated with RPS
procurement. 3 A dispute exists concerning separating or unbundling the renewable attribute from its underlying energy.
It is imperative to examine the multitude of implications that
unbundling would have for California ratepayers and the California environment before setting a REC trading program into
motion.' The California Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter "CPUC") is appropriately proceeding with caution in establishing a REC trading program, as there are many issues that
must be resolved prior to launching the program, including the
CPUC's authority to establish such a trading program! REC
trading, although not part of the RPS program as envisioned
The meaning of "bundling," as referred to in this Comment, however is slightly different. Here "bundling" simply means that the Renewable Energy Credit, or the renewable attribute of the underlying energy, travels with the energy, Le., it does not get
separated or "unbundled" and then separately traded.
2 According to Dr. Jan Hamrin of the Center for Resource Solutions, the difference between Renewable Energy Certificates and Credits is that Credits are actually
traded, while Certificates are not. ABA Teleconference Everything You Wanted to Know
about RECs, November 18, 2004, San Francisco
3 See
Green-e Renewable Electricity Certification Program, available at
http://www.green-e.org/(lastvisitedFeb4.2005).This Comment discusses the importance of imposing certain qualitative and quantitative restrictions on RECs that may
be traded within the RPS framework in the future. See infra, pp. 12-18 for more information on SB1078, SB1478,SB107, and the RPS program.
4 The creation of a REC trading program is but a segment of the following proceeding, in which all RPS issues are consolidated before the CPUC. See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program,
Rulemaking 04-04-026, (California Public Utilities Commission Apr. 22, 2004), available athttp://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIFINAL_DECISION/36206.htm. (last visited Feb 19, 2005). See also Table of documents filed in R0404026 to date, available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedingsIR0404026_doc.htm (last visited Feb 19, 2005). See
also Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standards Program (Draft Decision of ALJ Allen, Mailed Mar 7,
2005),
available
at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/COMMENT_DECISION/44308.htm (last visited
Apr 21, 2005).
5 See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the California, Renewables
Portfolio Standard Program, Rulemaking 04-04-026, , Assigned Commissioner's Ruling
and Scoping Memo Establishing Schedule for Phase Two of the Renewable Portfolio
Standard Proceeding, at 5 (California Public Utilities Commission Dec. 16, 2004)
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/42320.htm (last visited
Jan 20, 2005)
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by Senate Bill 1078 in 2002, may become so if newly introduced
Senate Bill 107 becomes law." RPS is a hybrid market-based
regulatory mechanism aiming to create a minimum market for
renewable energy resources by requiring energy retailers to
purchase electricity generated by eligible renewable resources
as a specified percentage of total kilowatt hours sold to retail
end-use customers each calendar year:
The proposition that the renewable attributes, or RECs,
should remain bundled <travel with the energy) unfortunately
stands at odds with the goals of renewable generation project
developers, who seek to create two separate commodities that
can then be sold for a combined higher price. s
Can the views of the renewable generation project developers be reconciled with environmental justice in such a way as to
make the REC trading system work to everyone's advantage?
Both groups want to improve the quality of the environment,
but one group also needs to make a profit in order to make the
effort viable.
Does the need to make a profit stand at odds
with the interests of the California environment, environmental justice, and empowering poor and minority groups?
Not necessarily so, and this paper will shed light on some avenues for cooperation between the various interest groups."
While a significant portion of the solution will undoubtedly
be resolved from a market-based vantage point, some regulatory inputs shall remain necessary as a safety net for potential
market failures. The reason for this is that while market solutions tend to be creative, it is very doubtful that markets alone,
without the regulatory backup mechanism, will adequately
protect multiple interests. It is particularly doubtful whether
the market alone is best suited to handle issues of environmental justice.lO A potential option in bridging the existing gap
in approaches to the problem may consist of setting quotas on
• See infra, pp.12-18 for more information on SBI078, SBI478,SB107, and the
RPSprogram
7Id.
B See infra, pp. 20-29
9 See, e.g., American Leaders Declaration of Energy Independence, available at
http://www.honorearth.org/initiatives/energy/independenceday/declaration.html, (last
visited May 1, 2005) (an example of how some Native Americans in the Great Plains
states perceive wind energy, as the clean, renewable solution to multiple problems)
10 For a comprehensive survey of major economic incentives and market-based
environmental programs implemented by governments, see Stephen M. Johnson, Economics, Equity, and the Environment, Environmental Law Institute (2004).
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how many unbundled RECs may be used toward RPS compliance. l l
This comment discusses the current debate over whether
or not to unbundle RECs and concludes that no regulatory or
legislative decision can be made without careful consideration
of the potential adverse environmental impacts of unbundling
upon disadvantaged communities. Part I explains the concept
of Distributed Generation, its history and its importance for
the electrical utility industry, paying particular attention to
renewable Distributed Generation. Next, it describes the role of
the CPUC in the argument regarding REC bundling. This part
also examines legislative efforts undertaken to deal with the
evolving relationship between renewable energy generators,
Distributed Generators and the Investor Owned Utilities (hereinafter "IOU"). Part I concludes with an exploration of the interplay between regulatory and market approaches to solving
various problems in California's recent power industry history.
Part II analyzes the pros and the cons of bundled RECs as they
relate to REC trading, ratepayers and owners of residential
photovoltaic systems. Part III first analyzes environmental
justice issues in the context of unbundling RECs, and then proposes that the California Legislature pass the newly introduced
Senate Bill 107.
1.

BACKGROUND

A.

DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

"Distributed generation involves the use of small scale
electric generating technologies installed at, or in close proximity to, the end-user's location. nt. Although DG can be located
11 See Senate Bill 107, introduced on January 20, 2005, proposed language of
amendment to Section 399.15 of the California Public Utilities Code, adding Section (g)
"The commission shall establish rules that authorize the use of renewable energy credits
to satisfy annual procurement targets. At a minimum, the rules shall do all of the following: ... (3) Limit the quantity of renewable energy credits that can be procured unbundled from electricity generation to meet the annual procurement targets of a retail
at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/publbilllsenlsb_0101seller .... "
available
0150/sb_107_biIC20050120_introduced.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2005).
12 See Rulemaking 99-10-025, Order Instituting Rulemaking into Distributed
Generation, at 1 (California Public Utilities Commission, Oct.21, 1999), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/staticlindustry/electricldistributed+generationldg_decisions.ht
m (last visited Feb 21,2005).
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on the premises of small scale commercial enterprises, many
renewable Distributed Generation systems are owned by individual home owners with wind and/or solar systems on their
rooftops. 13 Distributed Generation (hereinafter, "DG"), along
with energy storage, and targeted end-use and demand-side
management technologies, comprises what is commonly referred to as Distributed Energy Resources (hereinafter
"DER").14 The CPUC expects "that the use of distributed generation and DER will grow substantially in the coming years."'5
There are many advantages to Distributed Generation and
DER, particularly renewable DG.'6 DER can provide potential
benefits to the electrical network if employed with sufficient
care and foresight. 17 Potential benefits include reduced transmission and distribution line losses, avoided commodity costs
in terms of energy and capacity, enhanced reliability, improved
stability and power quality, increased responsiveness to load
growth, national security benefits by reducing dependence on
the grid, conservation of natural gas (if the DG is renewable,
not so if the customer simply burns gas in a micro-turbine), and
avoided utility cost of financing (unless the customer has a
higher financing cost). 18 From the renewable energy vantage
13 RECs can be generated both by large commercial renewable energy generators
(such as wind farms), and by DG (such as solar panels or couple of small wind turbines
on a homeowner's rooD. This comment addresses the unbundling of RECs overall, but
focuses on DG due to its particular advantages. Currently no data seem to have been
compiled on the exact quantity of one versus the other type, though it may be accurate
to state that number-wise, there are more homeowner-operated renewable Distributed
Generation systems than commercial ones, while in terms of total generating capacity,
the commercial installations probably generate much more capacity. Author's exchange
with the Staff of the National Renewably Energy Laboratory, United States Department
of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which maintains the
Renewable
Electric
Plant
Information
System
(REPiS),
available
at
http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/(lastvisited Feb 17,2005)
,. See Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Incentives for Distributed Generation and Distributed Energy Resources, Rulemaking 04-03017, at 4. (California Public Utilities Commission, Mar 16, 2004) available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdflFINAL_DECISION/34972.pdf
(last visited Feb 4,
2005)
15Id.
16 See
http://www.eere.energy.gov/de/pdfs/distenergyJs.pdf (last visited Jan
21, 2005), http://www.distributed-generation.com/Library I Maine.pdf (last visited Jan
20, 2005), http://www.undp.org I seedl eap I activities I wea I drafts-frame.html (last
visited Jan 21, 2005), and CPUC R.04-03-017
17 See supra, note 14.
18 See Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Incentives for Distributed Generation and Distributed Energy Resources, Assigned Commissioner and Administrative Law Judge's Ruling and Scoping Memo, R.04-03-017, at 4-6.
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point in general, there is also the promise of increased employment.!9
Moreover, there are specific environmental benefits resulting from renewable DG: nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide are
not produced; water and soil pollution are reduced; and there
are fewer power-plant siting impacts compared to those oflarge
central station power plants!O Finally, renewable DG carries
the promise of promoting environmental equity.2! Often fossilfuel burning power plants are disproportionately located in
poor and minority communities. 22 Fossil fuel power plants are
responsible for emissions of sulfur dioxide and another criteria
air pollutant, nitrogen oxide, which combine with volatile organic compounds to create ozone. 23 Thus, these communities
could benefit if renewable DG reached a large enough number
to allow for the closing of dirty power plants by supplying clean
and efficient electricity in their stead. It will, in all likelihood,
take a long time before renewable DG reaches critical mass,
(California
Public Utilities Commission, Aug,
6,
2004) available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/38555.htm.This Order considers the
methodology for evaluating DG cost effectiveness, as well as the factors that will be
used in such a methodology. The Energy Division and California Energy Commission
("CEC") collaboratively conducted a workshop on May 5, 2004 looking at several CECfunded research projects aimed at developing ways to quantify these values from the
perspective of various interests. A number of DG cost-benefit factors for possible inclusion in a cost-benefit methodology has come out of this workshop.
19 Some put the number at 240,000 jobs that could be created by 2020, if federal
policies favored renewable sources, while building new coal and gas-fired plants would
produce only about 80,000 jobs in comparison. See Plan to Junk Oil, Add Jobs: New
Pushes
Renewables
available
at
Coalition
http://www.apolloalliance.orglapollo_in_the_newslsfchron.cfm, (last visited Oct 3,
2004). See generally www.Apolloalliance.org.
20 See supra, note 18, at 4-6.
21Id.
22 See
Robert D. Bullard, It's Not Just, Pollution available at
http://www.ourplanet.com/imgversn/ 1221 bullard.html (last visited Jan 21, 2005). See
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 27 Environs Envtl. L.
& Pol'y J. 95(2003) p.6.
23 See EPA National Air Quality and Emission Trends Report 2003 Apendix A,
Table A-9 available at http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends I aqtrnd03 (last visited Jan
21,2005). The table shows National Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Estimates for a number
of years. In year 2000, the last year for which data is shown, of the total for all sources,
18,201 thousand short tons, 11,389 were emitted by fuel combustion in electric utilities,
whereof 10,723 were emitted by coal burning plants, 511 by oil, 9 by gas, and 59 by
internal combustion. In comparison, all of industrial processes, including chemical and
allied product manufacturing, metals processing, petroleum and related industries,
solvent utilization, textiles, leather, wood, pulp and paper, agriculture etc. amounted to
a total of 1,498 thousand short tons. Transportation was only slightly higher, at 1,805
thousand short tons.
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even though efforts are under way." There is hope, however.
Market-oriented entrepreneurs are, and will continue, to capitalize on the need to switch to renewable energy resources and
to decentralize the generation of electricity, making it cheaper
and more reliable, while creating a healthier environment. 25
Meanwhile, the government must take precautions to include
environmental justice concerns in the multitude of energy development plans, such as the REC trading program, because
the market tends to ignore the needs of those who cannot vote
with their dollars.
B.

THE ROLE OF THE CALIFORNIA PuBLIC UTILITIES

COMMISSION

The California Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter
"CPUC") derives its authority from the Constitution of the
State of California and from the California Legislature. 26 It was
created to regulate privately owned utilities, as well as the
railroad, rail transit and passenger transportation companies. 27
Its main regulatory responsibilities are rate setting and assuring safe services. 28
Public Utilities Commissions nationwide derive their
mandates from the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
(hereinafter "PUHCA").29 This Act was passed to "eliminate
unfair practices and other abuses by electricity and gas holding

See supra, note 14.
The California 2000-2001 crisis has cast many doubts on the contention that
deregulation would lead to a reduction in electricity prices. See Karina Garbesi, Public
Interest Impacts of Electricity Deregulation: Lessons from California and the U.S.,
unpublished article submitted to Environment and Planning Commission: Government
and Policy 9/15/2002. (kgarbesi@Csuhayward.edu) On DG in particular, see Order Instituting Rulemaking Into Distributed Generation, raises the issue of "Iocational market
power" in cases where the distributed generation is sited in areas with inadequate grid
capacity during peak load periods and therefore the price could be raised above competitive market levels for energy or ancillary services. This issue is one of five issues
that the CPUC defmed as arising in connection with the sale of excess capacity by
distributed generators. See supra, note 13, at 17.
26 CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 3 and 5.
27 See http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/cfaqs/(last visited Feb 4, 2005)
26 Id.
29 See CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Amy Abel and Larry Parker, Resources,
Science, and Industry Division, Electricity: The Road Toward Restructuring available
at Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, CRS Web,
http://www.iwar.org.uklnews-archive/crsl23425.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2004).
24

25
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companies by requiring federal control and regulation of interstate public utility holding companies. "30
Currently, the CPUC is involved in a large undertaking,
along with the California Energy Commission (hereinafter
"CEC"), in connection with the development of the RPS program and the treatment of RECs under the RPS.31 Part of that
undertaking is the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
"ALJ") Peter Allen's "Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable
Portfolio Standard Program, on which he recently issued a
draft decision."32 The ruling primarily concerns the question of
renewable DG REC ownership associated with the energy output from renewable DG facilities subsidized by Investor Owned
Utilities ratepayers.33 the CPUC wants to know whether the
ownership of RECs should be public or private and the rationale for it. 34 Most of all, the Commission wants to know how
RECs associated with those facilities fit into the RPS program.3S
30 "The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and the Federal Power Act
(FPA) of 1935 ... established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gave specific
and separate powers to the states and the federal government. A regulatory bargain
was made between the government and the utilities. In exchange for an exclusive
franchise service territory, utilities must provide electricity to all users at reasonable,
regulated rates. State regulatory commissions address intrastate utility activities,
including wholesale and retail rate-making ... Under the FPA, federal economic regulation addresses wholesale transactions and rates for electric power flowing in interstate
commerce." Id.
31 See supra note 4.
32 See
generally http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/published/rulings/39482.htm (last
visited Jan 23, 2005). See also Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standards Program (Draft Decision of ALJ
Allen,
Mailed
Mar
7,
2005),
available
at
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHED/COMMENT_DECISION/44308.htm (last visited
Apr 21, 2005).
33 Id. The Commission has not yet issued a decision on this ruling, but may do so
as this comment goes into print .
.. Id .
.. Id. The following questions have been posed to the parties to the proceeding
by Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "AW") Allen as a framework for their comments:

1) If a DG facility receives subsidies via CPUC and/or CEC programs, should the
RECs associated with output from those facilities be considered the property of the
public (i.e., California ratepayers)? Why or why not?

2) If the RECs are public property, can such RECs be used in the RPS program? If
so, how?
3) If the RECs are not public property, who do they belong to: the DG facility
owner, the local utility, or someone else? Why?
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The CPUC received numerous comments from various stakeholders as part of this administrative rulemaking process, upon
which ALJ Allen based his Draft Decision. 36 One of the key issues addressed by most parties to this proceeding is the issue of
whether RECs ought to be bundled or unbundled from the underlying energy.37
C.

LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO HANDLE THE
EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RENEWABLE ENERGY
GENERATORS, DISTRIBUTED GENERATORS AND THE
INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES

In order to understand how environmental justice may be
at stake in the proposed REC trading program, it is important
to review the following legislative efforts. The historical relationship of the renewable Distributed Generators and Investor
Owned Utilitiess in relation to RECs can be analyzed via: the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, the California
Public Utilities Code, Section 2827 net energy metering and coenergy metering, and Senate Bill 1078, which establishes the
California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program.38 The current debate, on the other hand, can be followed in the context of
Senate Bill 1478, which was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger on September 24, 2004,39 and Senate Bill 107, which was
just introduced by Senators Simitian and Perata on January

4) If the RECs are not public property, what public benefits are CPUC and/or CEC
subsidies supporting?
5) Should California consider a system of differential incentives for renewable DG
facilities, depending on whether the DG owner claims ownership of the associated
RECs?
6) What other issues relating to the participation of DG in the PRS program need
to be addressed immediately?
36 See Comments of the parties to the proceeding, list of documents available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/proceedings/R0404026.htm (last visited Feb 19, 2005).
37 [d.
38 CA PUB UTIL §399.11.
39 See Governor's Veto Message available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov 1pub 103041 bill 1sent sb_1451-15001 sb_1478_vC20040924.html (last visited Feb 19, 2005).
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20, 2005, in an attempt to revive legislation that died with
Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of Senate Bill 1478.40

1.

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978

In the years following the 1973 crisis caused by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries embargo, the U.S.
government acknowledged the importance of managing oil consumption and, for the first time in U.S. history, energy efficiency became a burning issue." In 1978, in an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence on fossil fuels, particularly imported
ones, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act (hereinafter "PURPA").42 PURPA was designed to encourage the growth of alternative energy usage and was aimed in
part at achieving efficient electricity generation and equitable
rates for consumers. 43 The Act requires that utilities buy power
from qualifying facilities (hereinafter "QFS")44 at prices equal to
the utility's avoided cost of purchasing from other sources!·
40 See
SBI07
Legislative
Counsel's
Digest
available
at
http:lneginfo.ca.gov/publbilVsenlsb_Ol0l-0150/sb_l07_bilC20050120_introduced.pdf
(last visited Feb 4, 2005).
41 See supra, note 29 .

.. [d.
43

[d .

.. Qualifying Facilities can be either cogenerators or small power producers, as
defined in section 3( 17) and (18) of the Federal Power Act [16 U.S.C.S. §§ 796( 17) and
(18)]:

"qualifying cogeneration facility" means a cogeneration facility which-(i) the Commission determines, by rule, meets such requirements (including
requirements respecting minimum size, fuel use, and fuel efficiency) as the ComIIlJ.SSlOn
may,
by
rule,
prescribe;
and
(ii) is owned by a person not primarily engaged in the generation or sale of
electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities or
small power production facilities); and
"qualifying small power production facility" means a small power production facility-(i) which the Commission determines, by rule, meets such requirements (including requirements respecting fuel use, fuel efficiency, and reliability) as the
Commission
may,
by
rule,
prescribe;
and
(ii) which is owned by a person not primarily engaged in the generation or
sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities
or small power production facilities) .
.. See supra, note 29. Qualifying Facilities are exempt under the 1935 Public
Utility Holding Company Act (hereinafter "PUHCA") and the 1935 Federal Power Act
(hereinafter "FPA"). "In addition to PURPA, the Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA, P.L. 95620) helped qualifying facilities (QFs) become established .. Under FUA, utilities were
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QFs are not subject to state regulatory oversight and can
achieve eligibility under PURPA through the use of renewable
fuels or by meeting minimum cogeneration standards adopted
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 46 Nonetheless,
by encouraging smaller power generators, Congress in essence
stimulated distributed generation, the benefits of which can
foremost be understood in terms of energy efficiency. One of
the potential benefits of DG is reduced transmission and distribution line losses, because Distributed Generation systems are
installed at, or in close proximity to, the end-user's location."
Thus a significant percentage of energy generation, which
would otherwise be lost in the form of heat, is instead utilized.'s
The main achievement ofPURPA, however, was the opening of
the energy market to non-utilities, which ultimately led to the
energy market deregulation in the 1990s.49

not permitted to use natural gas to fuel new generating technology. QFs, which are by
definition not utilities, were able to take advantage of abundant natural gas as well as
new generating technology, such as combined-cycle plants that use hot gases from
combustion turbines to generate additional power. These technologies lowered the
fmancial threshold for entrance into the electricity generation business as well as
shortened the lead time for constructing new plants. FUA was repealed in 1987, but by
this time QFs and small power producers had gained a portion of the total electricity
supply." [d. at 3.
46 [d.
47 Supra, note 14. See also Thomas Casten and Sean Casten, Transforming Electricity in the US, Cogeneration and On-site Power Production, Volume 2 Issue 6, November-December 2001, James & James (2001).
49 See Energy Information Administration / Annual Energy Review 2003 available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov / FTPROOT/ multifuel / 038403.pdf (last visited Jan 30,
2005). For year 2002, out of 3,858 billion kilowatt-hours, 241 were lost in transmission
and distribution, or unaccounted for, which amounts to 6.24 %.
49 Kevin Golden, Comment, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio Standard
- California Asserts its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 Ecology L.Q. 693, 696 (2003)
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California Public Utilities Code, Section 282750

Section 2827, the "net energy metering and co-energy metering" provision, was added to the California Public Utilities
Code in 1995 in an effort to "encourage substantial private investment in renewable energy resources, stimulate in-state
economic growth, reduce demand for electricity during peak
consumption periods, help stabilize California's energy supply
infrastructure, enhance the continued diversification of California's energy resource mix, and reduce interconnection and
administrative costs for electricity suppliers."61
Section 2827(g) attempts to level the playing field for renewable Distributed Generators, by prohibiting the retail utility from charging the Net-Metered Renewable Distributed
Generator (hereinafter "customer-generator") any fees other
than those associated with the "customer-generator's net kilowatt-hour consumption over a 12-month period, without regard

50

Relevant definitions are provided in Section 2827(b):

(2) "Eligible customer-generator" means a residential, small commercial customer
as defined in subdivision (h) of Section 331, commercial, industrial, or agricultural
customer of an electric service provider, who uses a solar or a wind turbine electrical generating facility, or a hybrid system of both, with a capacity of not more than
one megawatt that is located on the customer's owned, leased, or rented premises,
is interconnected and operates in parallel with the electric grid, and is intended
primarily to offset part or all of the customer's own electrical requirements.
(3) "Net energy metering" means measuring the difference between the electricity
supplied through the electric grid and the electricity generated by an eligible customer-generator and fed back to the electric grid over a 12-month period as described in subdivision (h). Net energy metering shall be accomplished using a single meter capable of registering the flow of electricity in two directions. An additional meter or meters to monitor the flow of electricity in each direction may be
installed with the consent of the customer-generator, at the expense of the electric
service provider, and the additional metering shall be used only to provide the information necessary to accurately bill or credit the customer-generator pursuant
to subdivision (h), or to collect solar or wind electric generating system performance information for research purposes. If the existing electrical meter of an eligible customer-generator is not capable of measuring the flow of electricity in two
directions, the customer-generator shall be responsible for all expenses involved in
purchasing and installing a meter that is able to measure electricity flow in two
directions. If an additional meter or meters are installed, the net energy metering
calculation shall yield a result identical to that of a single meter. An eligible customer-generator who already owns an existing solar or wind turbine electrical
generating facility, or a hybrid system of both, is eligible to receive net energy metering service in accordance with this section.
51

CA PUB UTIL § 2827(a)
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to the customer-generator's choice of electric service provider."52
Thus the customer-generator is freed from having to pay for
other rate components, such as transmission, distribution, public purpose programs, generation, nuclear decommissioning,
interconnection charges, standby charges, and minimum
monthly charges. 53 Non-renewable Distributed Generators still
have to pay for all these components, while receiving credit
only against the generation rate component. 54

3.

Senate Bill 1078

Senate Bill 1078 (California, 2002) (hereinafter "SB 1078")
established the California RPS program. 55 The RPS is a regulatory program that establishes requirements for the procurement of renewable energy and thereby seeks to create a market
in which sellers can participate. 56 The policy guiding this program is the creation of many security, economic, and environmental benefits for California. The program requires Investor
Owned Utilities,58 Electric Service Providers59 and Community
Choice Aggregators GO (hereinafter collectively "retail sellers") to
"purchase a specified minimum percentage of electricity gener57

Id. at § 2827(g).
Id.
54 Id.
.. SB 1078 § 1,(Ca. 2002) (amending Cal. Pub. Util.Code adding § 387)
66 Golden, supra note 49, at 699-700.
07 Id. See also Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, The Renewable Portfolio Standard: How
It
Works
and
Why
It's
Needed,
available
at
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheetslRPSHowWhy02.pdf(last visited Feb 19, 2005) .
.. "A privately-owned electric utility whose stock is publicly traded. It is rate
regulated and authorized to achieve an allowed rate of return." See Glossary available
at http://www.eia. doe.gov / glossary 1glossary j htm (last visited Jan 21, 2005) .
.. "Non-utility entities providing services as deimed under CPUC Rule 1." See
at
Glossary
available
http://www.pge.com/docs 1pdfs 1biz 1transmission_services 1contracts_tariffs 1di_handb
ookIGlossary.pdf(last visited Jan 21,2005).
'" See Assembly Bill 117, Migden (Ca. 2002). Electrical restructuring: aggregation. "(1) Existing law, relating to transactions between electricity suppliers and enduse customers, authorizes various entities to aggregate electrical loads, and defines an
"aggregator" as one of those entities that provides power supply services, including
combining the loads of multiple end-use customers and facilitating the sale and purchase of electrical energy, transmission, and other services on behalf of the end-use
customers. This bill would authorize customers to aggregate their electrical loads as
members of their local community with community choice aggregators, as defined ... "
http://leginfo.ca.gov Ipub/ 01·021 bill / asm / ab_0101·
0150/ ab_117_bilC20020924_chaptered.pdfOast visited Feb 19, 2005)
52

63
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ated by eligible renewable resources, as defined, in any given
year as a specified percentage of total kilowatt hours sold to
retail end-use customers each calendar year.""· Electricity retailers can achieve RPS compliance by owning a renewable
electricity generating facility or by purchasing electricity from
another facility that generates from renewable sources."2 RPS
is a hybrid program in the sense that it aims to achieve public
policy goals while staying true to a market-based approach.53
The policy goals it attempts to achieve are, inter alia, the correction of market failures, and the sustainability and marketability of new technologies. 64 Even though some legislative provisions may be contentious, the RPS "contains the fundamental
commitment necessary for a successful mandate to increase
renewable energy procurement through long-term purchase
obligations.""5 Under current law, "utilities must increase their
total procurement of eligible renewable energy resources by at
least one percent per year so that twenty percent of their retail
sales are procured from eligible renewable energy resources by
December 31, 2017. »66

4.

Senate Bills 1478 and 107

Senate Bill 1478 (hereinafter USB 1478") was vetoed by
Governor Schwarzenegger on September 24, 2004, after passing both the Senate and the Assembly.s7 This bill sought to increase the amount of electricity generated from renewable resources per year to "at least twenty percent of the total electricity sold to retail customers in California per year by the year
2010" from the current "at least seventeen percent of the total
electricity generated for consumption in California per year by

6. SB 1078 § 1, (Ca. 2002) adding Article 16 (commencing with Section 399.11) to
Chapter 2.3 of Part 1 of Division 1 of, the Cal. Pub. Util. Code), See Legislative Counsel's Digest (1). Also, see California Energy Commission, Draft Staff White Paper "Accelerated Renewable Energy Development" prepared in support of the 2004 Integrated
Energy Policy Report Update Proceeding (03-IEPR-01), July 30, 2004, 100-04-003D.
62 Golden, supra note 49, at 700.

Id.
Id.
.. Id. at 712 .
63

o.

.. CA
PUB
UTIL
§
399.15
(b)(1),
(Ca
2004);
See
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIFINAL_DECISION/36206.htm#P32_487
67 See supra, note 39.
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2006.''"8 It also sought to implement guidance necessary for
preventing double-counting in measuring RECs.69
SB1478 addressed the issue of REC ownership in contractual relationships, so that "[a] contract for the purchase of electricity generated by an eligible renewable energy resource shall
include the renewable energy credits associated with all electricity generation specified under the contract. rno Furthermore,
the bill was drafted to limit the "quantity of renewable energy
credits that can be procured unbundled from electricity generation to meet the annual procurement targets of a retail seller."71
SB 1478 hoped to improve the State's transmission system
by fast-tracking the approval process in order to facilitate the
development or delivery of renewable generation. 72 It, however,
allowed for additional flexibility in RPS compliance by attempting to establish rules authorizing "the use of renewable energy
credits to satisfy annual procurement targets. rna
Senate Bill 107 (hereinafter "SB107") seeks to revive SB
1478. It provides a much-needed definition for a "renewable
energy credit" and specifies the REC certification process,
which is to be carried out by the Energy Commission. REC is
defined as "a certificate of proof, issued through the accounting
system established by the Energy Commission pursuant to Section 399.13, that one unit of electricity was generated by an
eligible renewable energy resource and delivered to a retail
seller, the Independent System Operator, or a local publicly
owned utility subject to the requirements of subdivision (e) of
Section 399.13.'''"
7

'

68 SB 1478 Section 1. amending CA PUB RES § 25740, (Ca 2004) available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/billlsen/sb_14511500/sb_1478_bill_20040827_enrolled. pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005)
69 Id. E.g. double counting is a source of major contention between the utilities
and the renewable DG owners. While the utilities argue that their ratepayers would
have to pay twice for RECs if they were awarded to DG owners, DG owners contend
that by removing much of their demand from the grid, they are, on the other hand,
decreasing the overall number of KWh of retail sales, used as the basis for determining
the RPS procurement target for retail sellers. See infra, note 112.
70 SB 1478 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(E), (Ca 2004) available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/billlsen/sb_14511500/sb_1478_bilC2004082Lenrolled.pdf (last visited May 4, 2005).
71 Id. at §399.14(a)(2)(D)(v).
72 Id. at §399.11(e)
73 SB 1478 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(D), (Ca. 2004)
7. SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL § 387(e), (Ca. 2005)
75Id.
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SB107 does not "fail to recognize California's commitment
and reliance on an electricity market that includes the entire
western region of the country. me In contrast, it provides that
the Energy Commission "shall consult with other states in the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council transmission system
to develop consistent mechanisms and protocols for verifying
renewable energy credits and to prevent double counting of the
electricity generated from any eligible renewable energy resource" in establishing a REC tracking and verification system. 77
SB 107 does impose some restrictions on out-of-state electric generating facilities, however.78 For example, it limits eligibility to facilities located within the Western Electricity Coordinating Council transmission system that commence initial
operations after January 1,2005, under a guaranteed contract
with a retail seller and which can demonstrate delivery of the
contracted amount. 7• SB 107 allows for flexibility in RPS compliance rules for out-of-state REC imports where the underlying energy is sold into the California market and "no feasible or
cost-effective transmission facilities exist to deliver the electricity to the electrical corporation's service territory.""o
SB 107 refines the definition of "supplemental energy
payments" to cover only reasonable costs of eligible renewable
energy resources, and it reiterates that "[t]he commission may
not award supplemental energy payments for the sale or purchase of renewable energy credits."81 It locks in the supplemental energy payment price at the "applicable market price referent at the time of initial contracting."82 Supplemental energy
payments are structured as payments made by the California
Energy Commission to generators to cover the costs of longterm contracts with retail sellers that exceed the applicable

See supra, note 39.
SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL § 399.13 (c)
78 SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.16
79 [d. This provision is to prevent reallocation of payment for RECs from Western
States, that do not have RPS programs, to California ratepayers. Instead of such a
reallocation of payment, the program seeks to create real incremental difference in the
number of renewable energy providers.
60 SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(C) by adding(ii), (Ca 2004)
81 SBI07 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1), (Ca. 2005)
82 SB107 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1) by adding (C), (Ca. 2005)
76

77
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market price referent established by the CPUC."" Moreover, SB
107 further clarifies the requirement of demonstrability of "delivery of the electricity under contract to the retail seller serving end-use customers subject to the renewable energy public
goods charge ....• In terms of compliance with RPS, SB107 clarifies the commission's powers to enforce penalties, i.e., that the
CPUC is expected to enforce comparable penalties against
Electric Service Providers and Community Choice Aggregators."s

5.

Summary of Legislative Efforts

PURPA "cracked open the market to non-utility power
producers."86 It established an obligation for regulated utilities
to purchase the output of unregulated Qualifying Facilities at
the "avoided cost" that would otherwise be paid for energy in
the market, which was ultimately also its critical limitation,
particularly in the face of subsequent deregulation. B7 Public
Utilities Code Section 2827, through its net-metering program,
encourages renewable distributed generation by cutting all
charges associated with interconnection to the utilities, except
for the net consumption of electricity from the grid. BB And finally, SB 1078 created the RPS program, which establishes a
requirement for all Investor Owned Utilities, Electric Service
Providers and Community Choice Aggregators to increase their
procurement of renewable sources by at least one percent of
retail sales per year until reaching 20 percent no later than
2017. B9 Although it can be achieved by various means, for some
retailers, the potential of buying renewable energy credits may
83 See puc Sets Stage for Renewable Energy Needs, June 9, 2004, available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDINEWS_RELEASE/37327.htm (last visited Apr
21,2005)
.. SB107 amending CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(1) by adding (D), (Ca. 2005)This
provision is to protect the California environment and to stabilize markets.
56 SBI07 amending 399.14(d), (Ca. 2005)
86 Golden, supra note 49,at 696.
87 [d.
88 See CA PUB UTIL § 2827(g)
89 See, CA PUB UTIL §§ 399.11-399.16. SB 1078, chaptered on September 12,
2002; requires the Commission to establish a program whereby the utilities must purchase a specified minimum percentage of electricity generated by renewable energy
resources. The utilities must increase their total procurement of eligible renewable
energy resources by at least one percent per year so that twenty percent of their retail
sales are procured from eligible renewable energy resources by December 31, 2017.
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be more appealing than actually generating that energy, due to
limitations imposed by the lack of locally available renewable
energy resources and non-feasible transmission from remote
areas. SB107 recognizes this problem and allows utilities in
such a position to obtain unbundled RECs through long-term
purchase agreements.90
Requiring caps on how many RECs can be imported from
out-of-state and how many RECs can be unbundled should not
be understood as a roadblock to renewable energy generation.
It merely serves as a guarantee for the California environment.
To a certain extent, it also seeks to protect minority and lowincome communities. A system allowing unchecked unbundling of the renewable attribute from the underlying energy in
the name of market efficiency could potentially come at the expense of the Californian environment and her most vulnerable
communities. Such trading, however, has not yet been introduced into the California regulated market and existing California law does not provide for it. 91

D.

BALANCING REGULATIONS WITH MARKET INCENTIVES

Part of the discussion on how to achieve the RPS goals involves the debate of whether command-and-control regulation
or market incentives are a better approach. One of the effects
of market manipulations during the initial stages of deregulation in California is that briefly the balance had shifted in favor
of regulations. 9' Even though market mechanisms have steadily gained momentum from the 1990s onward, after the energy
crisis they were not trusted to do the job alone. Nonetheless,
market incentives continue to dominate the discourse. 93 While
90 SB107, amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.14 (a)(2)(C)(ii) Flexible rules for compliance (Ca, 2005).
91 There is a parallel trading scheme taking place in the unregulated market,
nationwide. There are firms that certify and track green energy products, such as the
Center for Resource Solutions. http://www.green-e.org/ last visited Feb 4, 2005). See
supra, note 3.
92 See Garbesi, supra note 25.
93 "It is very likely that in the current Congress it will be very difficult to pass
any environmental bill skewed in favor of regulatory methods rather than market
incentives". Roger S. Ballentine, Esq., President of Green Strategies, Inc., ABA Teleconference November 18, 2004. See Jim Rossi: The Common Law Duty to Serve and
Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring,
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1998). Professor Rossi is a known authority on energy law, who
espouses primarily market solutions. See his homepage at Florida State College of Law
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offering many incentives and creative solutions for the industry, alone they fail to provide assurances against abuse to the
public. 94 On the other hand, regulations, particularly those of
the technology-forcing kind, tend to stifle the entrepreneurial
spirit with their heavy-handed approach. 95 The complexity of
problems facing the energy industry calls for a creative, multifaceted approach. Regulations, in some instances, are necessary to spur technological innovation, and in others to prevent,
or at least control, abuses. However, regulations alone might
not suffice either. Thus, balanced market solutions may be
what are needed.
Balanced market solutions are important in encouraging
the entrepreneurial spirit upon which much of the investment
and innovation depend, while at the same time providing a
sense of guarantee to the public that if the market fails, the
government will step in and prevent socially unacceptable consequences from taking place. The RPS is a case in point. The
issue of unbundling RECs from the underlying energy is no
different from most environmental issues over the past two
decades - it revolves around the balancing of regulatory measures versus market incentives. Finding a workable compromise is the challenge that the CPUC must meet in order to facilitate further development of renewable generation, particularly Distributed Generation, while protecting consumers from
fraud and the state from descending into another energy crisis.
II.

DISCUSSION

The central issue in the REC "ownership" debate currently
before the CPUC is whether the renewable attribute of the enhttp://mailer.fsu.edu/-jrossil ; But See Alan Ramo California'S Energy Crisis - the
Perils of Crisis Management and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 Alb. L. Envtl.
Outlook 1 (2002) Professor Ramo is a known authority in the area of environmental
law dealing with environmental justice. He is the Environmental Law and Justice
Clinic Director at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. See also
Stephen M. Johnson, Economics, Equity, and the Environment, (Environmental Law
Institute, 2004) for a comprehensive overview of major economic incentive and marketbased environmental protection programs .
.. See supra, note 10.
95 Some environmental regulation, though by no means all of it, is "technologyforcing," meaning that it does not take into account the cost of implementation thereby
forcing technology to come forth with quick, albeit expensive, solutions in order to meet
the strict standards.
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ergy can be separated, or "unbundled," from the underlying
physical energy.96 The Discussion focuses on unbundling in regard to renewable DG, while the Proposal primarily addresses
the broader issue of unbundling in the context of renewable
generation in general, and concludes that while Investor
Owned Utilities and renewable energy entrepreneurs need to
be given sufficient incentives, the benefits of a REC trading
program need to be felt by all Californians equally. SB 107,
which incorporates such balancing efforts, should therefore be
passed.
A.

BUNDLING - THE CENTRAL ISSUE

Theoretically, the "renewable attribute" of energy can be
separated from the underlying energy. Renewable Distributed
Generators could sell this attribute in the fonn of RECs separately from the underlying energy, however, it is important
first to examine the multitude of implications such unbundling
would have for California ratepayers and the environment.
This section will first layout the arguments of the renewable DG industry, the utilities, and environmental groups in
regard to REC ownership as they pertain to the issue of bundling RECs.97 Then it will juxtapose two powerful opposing arguments - the argument of TURN, a non-profit ratepayer advocate organization, and of Mr. Beach, the owner of a small
residential photovoltaic system and industry consultant.

1.

The REC Ownership Debate

The DG industry argues outright that RECs are "distinct
and separate property" because it wants to maximize the return on its investment by selling the RECs. 98 The utilities, on

See supra, note 32.
The arguments were presented as comments and reply comments to CPUC
regarding Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation
of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program .
.. See Response of the California Solar Energy Industries Association to the
Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, Response of
the Vote Solar Initiative to the Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio
Standard Program, at 3., Central California Power, Comments to Responses, Adminis96

97
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the other hand, argue that if the DG system owners are able to
separate the renewable attribute from the underlying energy,
they receive a windfall. 99 The utilities contend that most of the
renewable DG facility owners receive ratepayer-sponsored subsidies to install the generating system.100 This subsidy can be
as high as fifty percent of the cost.IOI Furthermore, the utilities
note that renewable DG owners interconnect with the utilities
at no extra charge, to which other, non-renewable Distributed
Generators are subject. lo2 Then, as a result of net-metering,
renewable Distributed Generators are able to significantly reduce their energy bill. loa Next, instead of having the renewable
attribute automatically attach to the renewable energy that the
utility "buys" through the net-metering program, the utility
actually has to buy these RECs on the market separately.lo,
Thus, the renewable DG facility owners are receiving three
separate sources of revenue from their system, which, while an
incentive for them, may serve as a disincentive for the utilities.
This in turn may cripple the entire program, a program aimed
at stimulating the growth of the renewable energy industry.lOs
The utilities, on the other hand, are silent on the issue of
unbundling per se.106 It is their position, however, that RECs
associated with energy produced by renewable Distributed
Generators, which were subsidized by their ratepayers, ought
to be counted toward the utilities' RPS compliance. lo, Thus, the
utilities are arguing that RECs should travel with the energy,
trative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed
Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, at 3., and
Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership of Renewable Energy Credits
from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, at 3-4.
99 See opening comments ofPG&E, p.9;
100 [d. at 6.
101 [d.
102 CA PUB UTIL § 2827(g)
103 PGE Opening Comments at 8.
104 [d.
"" See Comments of TURN and GPI
106 See Comments of Pacific Gas and Electric Company Regarding Administrative
Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation
Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program, Reply Comments of Pacific
Gas and Electric Company Regarding Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting
Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable
Portfolio Standard Program., and Comments of San Diego Gas & Electric Company on
the Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio
Standard Program.
107 [d.
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i.e., that they should remain bundled. On the other hand, RPScompliant utilities may, in the future, want to be able to turn
around and sell those RECs, unbundled from the underlying
energy, to RPS non-compliant, or less compliant retail sellers.
This may be the reason they remain silent on the unbundling
issue per se. 108
The Union of Concerned Scientists, an independent nonprofit alliance of citizens and scientists, does not express its
opinion on the bundling issue, but merely advises the CPUC to
"provide immediate guidance on whether RECs can be unbundled, and [to] establish rules for REC trading in the next phase
of this proceeding.'''o, The Green Power Institute (hereinafter
"GPI"), while encouraging the CPUC and California Energy
Commission to "continue pursuing the development of an effective and robust REC trading system," does not explicitly address the issue of unbundling, though it can be inferred that it
favors unbundling, judging from the way it describes, and relates to the REC trading program. 110 The main concern of GPI,
however, is fairness in the sense that "a future REC trading
system might very well not count the renewable energy that is
generated and used on the customer side of the meter towards
any provider's total retail sales, thus over-counting the contribution of Distributed Generation RECs in comparison with
grid-distributed RECs.'''" GPI therefore argues that "if the customer side of the meter DG renewable energy is counted towards a utility's RPS obligation, then the corresponding
amount of energy should be added to the utility's sales pool in
order to avoid over crediting the REC contribution to the utility's energy supply mix.""2
108

[d.

Reply Comments of the Union of Concerned Scientists Regarding Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program.
110 Reply Comments of the Green Power Institute Regarding Administrative Law
Judge's Ruling Requesting Comments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewable Portfolio Standard Program. GPI is a program of the Pacific
Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, p. 4
111 [d. at 3.
112 [d. The RPS goal of the utilities is 20% of all retail electricity sales to derive
from renewable sources. Thus GPI is arguing that the DG facilities by supplying extra
energy to the grid, and even if using all of it themselves, are thereby reducing the utility retail sales volume of electricity, thus effectively already generating savings to the
utility. The DG facility owner should receive some type of recognition for this, such as
having all these megawatts of electricity going back and forth between the DG facilities
109
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TURN us. Mr. Beach

The polarized arguments in the REC ownership proceeding
are espoused by The Utility Reform Network (hereinafter
"TURN"), a non-profit ratepayer representative organization,
and Mr. Beach, an industry consultant and expert witness who
provides testimony on behalf of Qualifying Facilities interests
and large industrial electric customers who is also the owner of
a small residential photovoltaic system. 1l3 They stand at two
opposing ends. TURN focuses on net-metering as the main
analytical framework for determining what happens with the
RECs, maintaining they ought to travel with the net-metered
energy.ll' Mr. Beach, on the other hand, adamantly rejects
TURN's net-metering proposal, and instead focuses on the fact
that
renewable DG removes loads from the [utilities'] grids, and
thus reduces the amount of renewable power or RECs that
the [utility] must buy to meet their 20% RPS goals .... that the
benefits of the renewable peaking generation from [small
residential] solar panels [are] .. .likely to be far more valuable
per megawatt-hour than a REC .... [and that since he will]
bear 100% of the risks of producing RECs, [he has] an equitable claim on 100% of their ongoing value.1I6

In short, Mr. Beach believes RECs to be a distinct property,
separate from the underlying energy, which he is entitled to
sell to whomever he wants for the following reasons: (1) netmetering is not as generous to him as TURN makes it out to be,
(2) he bears all the risk associated with maintaining his photovoltaic system, and (3) if the utility were to receive his RECs,
he could remove his system from the grid, buy a battery with
and the utility properly accounted for in order to avoid double counting on either side.
This is an important point that most parties raise in one way or another.
113 See Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Ownership and
Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits Produced by Distributed Generation Facilities, September 16, 2004; and Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership
of Renewable Energy Credits from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, September 30, 2004
11. Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Ownership and
Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits Produced by Distributed Generation Facilities, September 16, 2004.
115 Reply Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Ownership of Renewable Energy
Credits from Renewable Distributed Generation Facilities, at 3-4., September 30, 2004
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the proceeds of the REC sale, and thus not contribute to peak
shaving, which is, as Mr. Beach claims, one of the most important benefits of the renewable DG systems.l16
B.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNBUNDLING FOR RENEWABLE

DISTRIBUTED GENERATORS
Perhaps net-metering does not proportionally offer the
same amount of benefit to the DG facility owner as it does to
the utility; however, beside weighing each side's economic
benefits there are also significant legal implications underlying
the net-metering relationship. A determination must be made
regarding whether the renewable Distributed Generators
would still qualify for special tariffs under the net-metering
program if they sold energy to the utility, but withheld the renewable attributes of the energy and sold those in the form of
RECs to a third party. The renewable energy, stripped of its
"renewable" attribute is in essence no longer renewable. The
net-metering program, however, was designed specifically to
promote renewable Distributed Generators, i.e., Distributed
Generators that generate electricity from non-polluting renewable sources, primarily solar and wind. 117 Thus, if the DG facilities were to unbundle the renewable attributes and sell only
the underlying energy to the utility, stripped of its renewable
attribute, they would no longer be honoring the net-metering
terms, because the utility would no longer be getting "renewable energy" for its favorable tariffs and waivers of interconnection fees. Instead it would just be getting "energy," which was
not the legislative intent behind Section 2827. 118
In October 2003, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "FERC") ruled on a similar state of affairs. 119
116 "Peak shaving" is a set of creative methods of meeting the ever increasing
energy demand during peak hours. photovoltaic Distributed Generators, for example,
generate extra capacity in the middle of the day when demand is peaking. If they are
interconnected with the grid, utilities can supply other customers who need extra energy with the photovoltaic generated electricity during peak hours without having to
make costly investments in capacity building infrastructure.
117 CA PUB UTIL § 2827
lIB CA PUB UTIL § 2827 (a) "The Legislature fmds and declares that a program
to provide net energy metering for eligible customer-generators is one way to encourage
substantial private investment in renewable energy resources ... "
119 Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order, issued October 1, 2003, Docket
No. EL03-133-000, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay
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FERC had decided in favor of renewable QFS.120 It ruled that
RECs associated with the generation of renewable energy from
those facilities were not automatically transferred to the utilities with which the QFs had entered into long term contracts
under PURPA, unless specified to the contrary in the contract. 121 FERC held that RECs are a creation of state law and
that ownership rights to RECs under Qualifying Facilities contracts are therefore to be addressed by states pursuant to their
own statutes. 122 Similarly to the issue before the CPUC, the
FERC case involved utilities and non-utility generators under a
statutorily guided contract.123 However, "the avoided cost that a
utility pays a QF does not depend on the type of QF, i.e.,
whether it is a fossil-fuel-cogeneration facility or a renewableenergy small power production facility. ",2. What can be logically inferred is that the utility is paying merely for energy, not
for a specific quality associated with that energy, which is exactly what FERC decided. 125 In contrast, the net-metering tariff
arrangements between the utilities and the renewable Distributed Generators are specifically based on the renewable attribute of the energy generated by the Distributed Generation systems. 126 Thus, it can be inferred that since the tariff terms are
specifically based on the energy having been generated from
renewable sources, the renewable DG facility owners, by agreeing to the tariff, agree to automatically transfer RECs to the
utilities.
At first glance at the controversy surrounding the CPUC
Rulemaking on Distributed-Generation Renewable-EnergyPower Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. See also supra, pp. 9-11, for an
explanation on what QFs are and how they came into existence.
120

[d.

121 "We will grant Petitioners' request for declaratory order, to the extent that the
petition asks that the Commission declare that the Commission's avoided cost regulations did not contemplate the existence of RECs and that the avoided cost rates for
capacity and energy sold under contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey the RECs, in the absence of an express contractual provision." [d. at 4.
122 [d. at 6.
123 In the case of QFs, their contract with the utilities is guided by PURPA of
1978, and the net-metering contracts with renewable DG facilities are guided by SB
1078 provisions for the Renewable Portfolio Standard.
124 "Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order," issued October 1, 2003,
Docket No. EL03-133-000, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. p. 6
125
125

[d.
[d.
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Certificate ownership, one is struck by the unfairness and lack
of logic and precedent in allowing ownership of a certain aspect
of property to be conveyed to those who subsidized part of the
property. 127 However, if the problem is presented in terms of
net-metering, rather than in terms of subsidies per se, a new
picture emerges. TURN's comments are based on the terms
and conditions associated with the net-metering tariff.12S It can
hardly be said that TURN is known to sympathize with the
utilities, so the fact that it is taking the same position as the
utilities (PG&E particularly) is worth examining.
TURN and GPI approach this issue out of concern for the
ratepayers and the environment. 129 The utilities have a lot to
gain but even more to lose. Significantly, if the utilities lose,
everyone will lose this particular battle. Namely, as PG&E
poignantly expressed in its answer to a question in Judge Allen's questionnaire, the utilities need incentives to participate
in these public goods programs. 130 While required to provide
net-metering by law, the utilities can nonetheless make the
process so burdensome that in effect they would discourage
renewable DG.'31 On the other hand, the renewable DG facility
owners could go the other extreme and disconnect from the grid
altogether, thereby not contributing to the overall efficiency of

127 See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the California Renewables
Portfolio Standard Program - Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Requesting Com·
ments on Participation of Distributed Generation Resources in the Renewables Portfo·
lio Standard Program, Rulemaking 04-04-026 (California Public Utilities Commission,
Sept.
1,
2004)
available
at
http://www.cpuc.ca.govIPUBLISHEDIRULINGS/39482.htm(last visited, Feb 21, 2005)
128 See TURN's Opening Comments.
129 Green Power Initiative is a program of the Pacific Institute for Studies in
Development, Environment and Security; see GPI's Reply Comments.
130 See PG&E's opening comments, reply to Question 6, p. 12: "If utilities are not
permitted to recover the cost of buying RECs from renewable DG projects, they will not
buy them."
131 GPI stressed the need to give the utilities incentives for participating in the
program: "The GPI's position is that the RECs associated with customer-side-of-themeter energy that has been supported by state renewable energy programs can be
counted toward the RPS requirement of the utility to which the generator is interconnected, as long as the associated energy is also added to the utility's total retail sales.
This would not provide an additional revenue source for the DG generator, as desired
by many DG advocates, but it would provide an incentive to the interconnecting utility
to facilitate the transaction, and that might very well be worth more than the ultimate
value of the RECs." GPl's Reply Comments, p. 4.
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the grid via peak shaving. 132 The solution must lie somewhere
in the middle. If the renewable energy incentives are to work,
the CPUC must find a balance that is fair and just for all the
stakeholders.
C.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

On March 7, 2005 ALJ Allen issued a Draft Decision on
the matter, "Opinion Clarifying Participation of Renewable
Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standards
Program.'''S3 Far from clarifying anything, the decision holds
that "the owner of the renewable DG facilities owns the RECs
associated with the generation of electricity from those facilities, [that] those RECs may be used to satisfy the utilities' RPS
targets, and the RECs stay bundled with the associated electricity."'s,
The only party relatively happy with the Draft Decision is
Mr. Beach, who states: "With this one change, I recommend
that the full Commission adopt ALJ Allen's well crafted
P[roposed] D[ecision.]",35 Meanwhile TURN and PG&E vociferously criticize the Draft Decision as "taking a schizophrenic
approach to this proposal" and as being "profoundly flawed. ms6
In TURN's words:
[T]he PD fails to provide clarity on the only contested issue
that truly matters - how the RECs from a renewable DG unit
will be counted under the RPS program. While the PD finds
that RPS-eligible RECs must remain bundled with physical
electricity and that such RECs can be used to satisfY RPS targets, it fails to offer any guidance on the conditions under
132 As Mr. Beach pointed out in his Reply Comments on p.9, however, then they
would not be eligible for any net-metering benefits, and would most likely jeopardize
other state subsidies.
133 See supra notes 4, 32,36
134 [d. at 2.
135 See Opening Comments of R. Thomas Beach on the Proposed Decision of ALJ
Allen on the Ownership of Renewable Energy Credits from Renewable Distributed
Generation Facilities, Mar 28, 2005, p.3.
136 See Opening Comments of The Utility Reform Network of the Proposed Decision of ALJ Allen on the Ownership and Disposition of Renewable Energy Credits
Produced by Distributed Generation Facilities, Mar 28, 2005, p. 4; Comments of Pacific
Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) on the Draft Decision of ALJ Allen Clarifying Participation of Renewable Distributed Generation in the Renewable Portfolio Standard
Program, Mar 28, 2005, p.l3.
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which RECs are actually transferred to the relevant InvestorOwned Utility.137

PG&E protests ALJ Allen's conclusion that "if a facility
does not participate in the RPS program, then its output cannot be counted for RPS purposes," stating that such a conclusion "is expressly contrary to the existing RPS statute, which
allows the utilities to count toward the RPS goal any energy
purchased from a renewable source, whether or not the energy
was purchased 'under a standard RPS contract.'",38 Further,
PG&E claims that the CPUC, by not quantifying "the exact
amount of benefits the subsidies are paying for ... it will give all
the attributes of renewable DG to the DG owner" thereby making the ratepayer pay twice for the renewable attribute. 139
PG&E agrees that the energy produced by the DG unit can be
added to the utility's total retail sales in calculating RPS compliance, to avoid double counting, however, only if it is delivered to the grid under the net metering tariff. 140
It remains to be seen what the final decision will hold. The
CPUC must take a more balanced approach than the one espoused in the Draft Decision, if the RPS program is to be a success.

III.

PROPOSAL

Unbundling of RECs may harm California's disadvantaged
communities. The potential for harm requires that affected
community representatives have meaningful participation in
the CPUC's regulatory process and necessitates consideration
of environmental justice as part of the decision-making process.
SB 107 seeks to strengthen California's commitment to environmental justice while shifting the energy paradigm, commensurate with the needs of our times and should therefore be
supported by the California legislature and, this time around,
by the Governor. 141 The RPS program contains provisions for
direct utilities to give preference to any renewable energy project bid that provides benefits to low-income and minority
137
138

TURN Opening Comments, p.l.
See supra, PG&E's Comments, p.2.

140

[d.
[d.

141

See supra, note 39.

139
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communities, confirming the will of the people of California
through their democratically elected legislature to make the
RPS program environmentally just.142 Additionally, the current
law ought to include renewable energy project selection criteria
based on the relative impact of environmental benefits on low
income and minority communities.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF
UNBUNDLING RECS

1.

What is Environmental Justice?

Environmental justice is a relatively new political and social movement that addresses the inequitable distribution of
environmental harms by making sure affected communities
have a meaningful voice in the process of environmental decision-making. 143 It has evolved as a legal doctrine since its inception with President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994.144 Executive Order 12898 mandates "each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United
States .... "145 Even though the language of the order is rather
vague and is binding only on Federal agencies, its promulgation was a big success for environmental justice activists. In
response to these federal initiatives, California soon followed
with its own environmental justice statute by adopting a California environmental justice policy on October 6, 1999.146
With the growing popularity of market-based approaches
to resolving environmental problems, environmental justice
issues are also becoming more acute. As economic theory revolves around the concept of efficiency, by its very nature it is
142 See CA PUB RES § 25743 (b)(6).
Rechtschaffen, supra note 23, at 96-98
See Alan Ramo, Albany Law Environmental Outlook Jrnl. Vol 7, 2002, Issues 1
and 2, p. 12 (2002)
". Executive Order 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-income Populations, February 11, 1994, Section l-lOI.
Agency Responsibilities
146 Ramo, supra note 144, at 13.
143

144
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not suitable for taking issues of justice into account. Under
classic economic theory, a pollution credits program, for example, operates on the premise of efficiency when it shifts pollution to low income communities or communities of color. 147 Furthermore, such "efficiency" is deemed highly desirable because
resources are allocated where the willingness and ability to pay
for them are higher. 148 Grass roots environmental justice activism, on the other hand, coupled with law has had numerous
successes in empowering disaffected communities and furthering their interests.149

2.

An Example of Market Failure in Pollution Credits
Trading

Even those people leaning toward market-based regulatory
mechanisms have acknowledged the inadequacy of pollution
credits trading for dealing with most environmental problems. 15o Two of the most prominent reasons cited are the potential for creating local toxic hot spots, as well as administrative
difficulties that present themselves in monitoring the success
of such programs. lSI
Pollution credits trading is one of a number of Economic
Incentive Systems (hereinafter "EIS").152 In contrast to traditional regulatory command-and-control methods, which establish how much pollution each actor can generate, EIS establish
a price for each unit of pollution but leave the level of pollution
up to the actors to determine. 163 The main rationale for EIS is
their comparative cost efficiency and flexibility.164 If used for a
narrow environmental purpose for which the particular eco147

See Stephen M. Johnson, 56 Wash, & Lee L. Rev. 111, 118-119 (1999)

1<" [d.
149 Debate exists among environmental justice activists whether lawyers are
doing more harm by potentially making affected communities more dependent on the
system instead of changing it. There is, nonetheless, a movement among environmental justice lawyers to use creativity to emphasize empowerment of these communities over classic litigation. See Luke Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 Ecology Law Quarterly 619
(1992).
150 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
Cap.U.L.Rev.21, 22 (2001)
151

[d.

152

Stewart, supra note 150, at 94

"" [d.
154 [d.
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nomic instrument is well suited, EIS can be very meaningful;
however, sometimes in the process there is not enough room for
public participation and broader ethical and collective values
may end up ignored. 155
On the other hand, one can ''build a variety of hybrid systems of regulation, combining elements of both the command
and EIS approaches ... [flor example, command regulation could
require a minimum level of control by each source, while taxes
or fees could be imposed or a tradable quota system established
for remaining dischargers.",56 The RPS program, as envisioned
by SB 107 amendments, also seeks to establish such a hybrid
system.157 For example, SB 107 seeks to amend Section 399.15
of the Public Utilities Code, inter alia, by adding subsection (g),
which would require the CPUC to "establish rules that authorize the use of renewable energy credits to satisfy annual procurement targets," as under current law it is debatable
whether the commission may do SO.'56 These rules are to contain certain restrictions, however. One of the proposed restrictions is the limitation of the quantity of the RECs that can be
procured unbundled from electricity generation to meet the
retailer's annual procurement targets. '5"
Pollution trading programs, if not carefully devised, can be
more damaging than helpful. The Los Angeles Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market (hereinafter "RECLAIM"), for example,
has received mixed reviews even from EIS proponents, while it
is under severe attack from environmental groupS.'60
RECLAIM, designed to curb Los Angeles's persisting ozone
problems, created the first mandatory market in nitrogen oxide
and sulfur oxide emissions, precursors to ozone. 161 Facilities
that emit four tons a year of either pollutant must participate

[d. at 96.
[d. at 99.
I.' See generally SB 107 (Ca. 2005)
158 SB107, amending CA PUB UTIL § 399.15 by adding (g)(3) (Ca. 2005).
159 [d.
160 "RECLAIM has achieved a mixed record of success." Stewart, supra note145,
at 107. On July 23, 1997, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) filed an administrative complaint with the EPA against the Southern California Air Quality
Management District (SCAQMD) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
under title Vl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Chinn, infra note 155, at 97-98.
161 Lily N. Chinn, Comment, Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 Ecology L.Q. 80, 89-90 (1999)
155

156
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in the market. 162 They are then allocated emission permits
based on a combination of historical activity levels and applicable required emission controls.l63 Since Los Angeles is not meeting national ambient air quality standards, the allowable pollution amount for participants decreases annually. 164
The goal of using the decreasing cap is to significantly reduce emission levels of the two pollutants. 165 Instead of imposing the same set of goals and methods for each facility, this
market-based approach allows each facility to tailor its own
most cost effective method for reducing emission standards. ISS
Thus, annual savings relative to the command and control approach were projected at an average of $57.2 million.ls7 Despite
numerous technical problems, and in spite of environmental
injustice claims, some Econmic Incentives Systems proponents
state that "RECLAIM has achieved significant pollution reductions at compliance costs below that they would have been under an equivalent command regulatory system. m68 Others criticize RECLAIM and other such programs for violation of ambient standards and creation of toxic "hot spots. ",69
Communities for a Better Environment (hereinafter
"CBE"), on the other hand, has heavily criticized the program,
primarily for allowing the sale of mobile source credits on the
RECLAIM market. 170 Such credits could be obtained by scrapping old, highly polluting cars (mobile sources) under Rule
1610.171 Thus, heavily polluting stationary sources could buy
excessively cheap credits, up to a regulated level, generated by
the scrapping of old cars, instead of installing expensive scrubbing systems.172 According to studies conducted by CBE, the

Id. at 90.
Id.
1.. Id. at 91.
1.. Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Stewart, supra note 148, at 107.
169 Jonathan Remy Nash and Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Design·
ing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 Ecology
L.Q. 569, 609-624 (2001)
170 Id. at 613.
171 Id. at 612.
172 Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke Env. L & Pol'y F 231, 247-248
(1999)
162

163
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program has been plagued by corruption and inadequacies. 173
For example, the cars that were being scrapped were not going
to remain on the roads much longer. 174 Therefore, their scrapping was not going to contribute to actual reduction of emissions. 176 Allegedly, the car scrapping program was also fraught
with "double-counting" corruption schemes, whereby the engines of "scrapped" cars would be saved and installed in other
cars, which would also defeat the purpose.176 Nonetheless, the
main problem CBE had with RECLAIM's inclusion of mobile
source credits in the program was that the effects of mobile
sources are distributed fairly evenly across a regulated area,
while in contrast, industrial polluters can, and in this case
were, "disproportionately located in minority areas ... of the
four companies that have purchased most of the emission credits, 'three are located close together' in two communities that
are heavily populated by Latinos.!!t77 The following paragraph
by Richard Toshiyuki Drury of CBE best summarizes CBE's
concerns regarding RECLAIM:
The reality of pollution trading on the ground has not been as
rosy as the academics and economists predicted. The experience in Los Angeles shows that, in economic terms, the emissions trading market has been plagued by market failures
like any other market. These market failures have created
pollution hot-spots and have allowed trading fraud and antidemocratic outcomes. These results occurred in a region with
vast human and financial capital, including perhaps the largest and most sophisticated air pollution regulatory institution
in the world. These difficulties came from the oldest trading
programs ever developed for urban air pollution, but they are
not unique to pollution trading in Los Angeles. Rather, similar concerns and variations on the problems encountered in
Los Angeles are likely to be experienced in any market incentives program that relies on trading in emission reduction
credits. 178

[d. at 258-268.
'" [d. at 261-262.
175 [d.
176 [d. at 26l.
177 Nash and Revesz, supra note 169, at 613.
178 See supra note 172 at 269-270
173
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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE UNBUNDLING OF RECs

Environmental justice may be an argument in favor of
keeping RECs bundled, or at the very least, for limiting the
amount of unbundled RECs that can count toward RPS compliance, particularly the renewable Distributed Generation generated RECs.'79 At the core of what Environmental Justice activists are trying to achieve is the displacement of dirty generation disproportionately located in poor and minority communities. The RPS program could help with this goal in several regards: by limiting out-of-state RECs, by requiring physical delivery of electricity generated from renewable sources for instate REC trading, by limiting RPS-eligible RECs to those that
remain bundled with the physical energy, and by encouraging
renewable energy projects in economically depressed rural areas.
California has a strong interest in limiting the number of
out-of-state RECs that can be counted toward RPS compliance. 'SO The current RPS program already contains provisions
favoring in-state renewable resources and the newly introduced
SB 107 further reinforces them. lSI Moreover, SB107 contains
provisions limiting RPS eligibility to new out-of-state renewable energy facilities, and requires proof of physical delivery of
renewable energy into California. ,s2 RECs, in order to be RPSeligible, need to meet certain environmental criteria; otherwise
the program would be meaningless, as the idea behind RECs is
to stimulate generation of energy from renewable sources. Restrictions must also be placed on where generated RECs may
be purchased if the goals of the RPS program are to be met.
For example, if California utilities and other electricity retailers could comply with the RPS target by purchasing unlimited
amounts of cheap wind energy, or RECs associated with such
energy, from an out-of-state renewable energy generator, they
could forego supporting in-state renewable sources, which may
be somewhat more expensive. ,s3
See supra note 10.
See SB107, amending §§ 399.12 , 399.16, and adding § 399.17 (Ca. 2005),
available
at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/publbill/sen/sb_01010150/sb_107_bilL20050120_introduced.pdf
179
180

181
182

183

[d.

See supra, notes 78,79
E.g. solar, biomass, biogas etc.
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Unrestricted import of renewable energy from out of state
would not only harm the viability of in-state renewable energy
programs, but local air quality would not gain the benefits of
having more in-state energy produced through local renewable
energy generators. la• The reason for this is that retailers who
procure their energy from dirty power plants could buy cheap
unbundled RECs from out of state and meet the current RPS
procurement goal, but could simultaneously continue to generate as much local pollution as before. Thus, the environmental
benefits associated with generating electricity from renewables,
as opposed to fossil fuels, would go to out-of-state communities
hosting the renewable energy generation facilities. If California were to find itself in such a scenario, it is highly likely that
low income communities and communities of color would be
disproportionately subjected to resultant environmental degradation, as these are the communities in which the old polluting
power plants are located. la5
Certain geographic areas, however, do not have much to offer in terms of renewable energy resources, or even if they do,
transmission of those resources remains a serious problem. la6
In such limited instances, the unbundling of RECs and imports
from out of state may be the "least-cost best-fit solution.»!a7
SB107 recognizes such situations by providing a degree of
flexibility.laa
Environmental justice is, of course, part of the larger environmental picture of California. Overall environmental degradation could result from unbridled importation of renewable
energy, or RECs from out of state for the purpose of RPS compliance. Any such environmental degradation is sure to affect
low income and minority communities to a larger degree than
the overall population. la9 SB 107 limits the RPS compliance
eligibility for out-of-state RECs, for RECs generated by new
facilities, and for requiring physical delivery of renewable en-

See supra, pp.4-7.
See supra, note 22.
lll6 This problem is recognized by SB 107.
. SB 107 adding CA PUB UTIL
§399.14(a)(2)(C)(ii), (Ca. 2005). See also, CEC White Paper, Chapter 4, for geographic
distribution of renewable resources throughout California.
187 See CA PUB UTIL §399.14(a)(2)(B).
188 See supra, note 187.
189 See supra, note 22.
184

185
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ergy. SBI07 does so in the interest of the California environment, and should for that reason be supported. 190
The RPS program must require that physical renewable
energy be delivered to the grid. If RECs were unbundled, especially unbundled without any limitations as to the quantity of
such RECs that can count toward in-state RPS compliance,
without regard to the quality of renewable energy resources or
the location where they were created through generation of a
specified unit of renewable energy, California's environment
could be seriously jeopardized. According to economic theory of
efficiency, in an unfettered free market, minority and lowincome communities would most likely be the first to fall victim
to such environmental degradation. 191
On the DG front, if RECs were to remain bundled with the
underlying energy, then much of the problem would be eliminated and consumer confidence in the REC trading system
could be maintained. The CPUC needs to continue requiring
physical delivery of renewable energy for purposes of satisfying
RPS obligations. At least the utilities ought to be able to count
all the net-metered renewable energy toward their RPS compliance. It would remain to be seen what happens with the
surplus energy, not net-metered. It would also be fair for the
utilities to compensate renewable DG owners for the energy
released onto the grid in excess of the net-metered energy.192 In
any case, if the utility does not purchase the excess energy
from the renewable DG owner, then RECs associated with that
energy ought to remain with the DG owner.193 The question is
whether it is worth investing in complex metering instruments
to figure out so many details of the transaction. 19'
By the CPUC requiring that only bundled RECs be eligible
toward RPS compliance, the net-metering arrangements between renewable Distributed Generators and the utilities
would maintain their legitimacy. 195 If net-metered renewable
See supra, n. 180.
See supra, note 147.
•
192 Currently any excess energy is practically a gift to the utility ..
193 See supra pp. 24-27(The argument on net-metering tariffs).
194 One of the many undertakings in connection with DG, currently before the
CPUC, is also an effort to remove barriers to effective and unified metering. E.g. Scott
Tomashefsky (CEC), A Report Submitted on Behalf of Some Rule 21 Working Group
Members, Potential Topics for Consideration in CPUC DG OIR, June 5, 2003.
1911 See supra, pp.24-27.
190

19.
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DG owners were to unbundle RECs and sell them separately to
third parties (not the utility they are interconnected with), they
may lose their net-metering eligibility, and thereby much of the
financial incentive for investing in the generating infrastructure in the first place. 196 In an absolute world of complete bundling, however, the renewable DG entrepreneurs might have
less financial incentive to engage in the program. 197 As for the
financial health of renewable DG owners, the separation of the
renewable attribute from the underlying energy could potentially give DG owners and developers of large-scale renewable
facilities more flexibility. However, if they want to sell those
RECs for purposes of RPS compliance, steps need to be taken to
prevent double-counting, environmental injustice, and degradation of the Californian environment. SB 107 contains most
of the necessary REC eligibility restrictions, as does ALJ Allen's current draft decision, at least in regard to limiting RPS
eligibility to bundled RECs.198
Meanwhile, plentiful creative solutions may already exist
to combat the problem of environmental injustice. By facilitating large renewable electricity projects in poor, rural areas, a
lot could be done to empower local communities.
Moreover,
renewable energy projects selection criteria ought to include
the relative impact of environmental benefits on low-income
and minority communities.
If unbundled without limitations, generation from renewable resources could be promoted strictly as a function of market efficiency rather than as part of a desperately needed comprehensive paradigm shift in energy policy. In the short run,
renewable energy may not seem the most cost-efficient solution
to many energy problems. In the long run, however, a new way
of thinking about energy will have to take place, not only to
resolve issues of growing energy demand worldwide coupled
with decreasing fossil fuel reserves, but also the accompanying
political and social upheavals abroad as well as at home. 199
Government regulations are better suited for implementation
of long-term policies than markets themselves, as the goal of
market efficiency is not the best guiding principle in the com196
1Jl7
IJl6
IJl9

[d.

See supra, pp.23-24.
See supra, note 180.
The ongoing war in Iraq is merely a harbinger of this trend.
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plexity of the world we live in today. A hybrid of the two approaches, such as the RPS program with the proposed quota,
would bring together the best of both approaches.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is the intent of the legislature, as seen through the existing RPS program and the pending SB 107, to further stimulate
renewable energy to the benefit of the entire population of California. 200 The future renewable energy credits trading program
may contribute to that goal if carefully implemented, without
encroaching on the prerogatives of the California RPS. In particular, unbundled RECs should not be allowed toward RPS
compliance except in those rare instances when geography prevents a retailer from obtaining renewable energy. SB 107
takes those instances into consideration. 201 Solutions regarding
the design and eligibility requirements of the future California
regulated REC trading program ought to be beneficial to all
California citizens, including low income and minority communities, and of course, the utility ratepayers. At the same time,
sufficient incentives must be offered to the investor owned
utilities as well as the renewable energy entrepreneurs, two
groups of players with often opposing views that are essential
for the success of this program.
As the trend toward reliance on pollution credit trading
and other market-based approaches to battling pollution
quickly grows, concerns regarding environmental justice are
also on the rise. Unfortunately, most of those who approach
this problem from a market-based vantage point tend to overlook environmental justice issues. 202 That is a serious omission
but it does not have to be that way, and, it is hoped, will not be
repeated here. We must exercise caution when designing the
REC trading program, paying attention to environmental justice issues, and not sweeping them under the rug in the name
of "market efficiency." It is imperative that California, being at
See CA PUB UTIL §399.11, and SB 107 amending CA PUB UTIL §399.11
See supra, note 187
202 "Professors Ackerman and Stewart, early advocates of trading programs, recognized the 'hot spot' problem more than a decade ago, but defended trading by arguing
that the existing command-and-control approach does not prevent 'hot spots' either."
Stephen M. Johnson, Economics, Equity, and the Environment, Environmental Law
Institute, (Washington D.C., 2004).
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the forefront of the sustainable energy policy struggle, and
shaping the way for the rest of the country, finds the right answer in this important matter.
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